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<front>
<journal-meta>
  <journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">67</journal-id>
  <journal-id journal-id-type="short-title">gfpr</journal-id>
  <journal-id journal-id-type="doi">10.31703/gfpr</journal-id>
  <journal-title-group>
    <journal-title>Global Foreign Policies Review</journal-title>
    <abbrev-journal-title abbrev-type="publisher">gfpr</abbrev-journal-title>
  </journal-title-group>
  <issn publication-format="print">2788-502X</issn>
  <issn publication-format="electronic">2788-5038</issn>
  <self-uri xlink:href="https://gfprjournal.com"/>
  <publisher>
    <publisher-name>Humanity Publications</publisher-name>
    <publisher-loc>Pakistan</publisher-loc>
  </publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
  <article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">394758</article-id>
  <article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.31703/gfpr.2021(IV-II).01</article-id>
  <article-id pub-id-type="other" specific-use="submission-id">5225</article-id>
  <article-version article-version-type="publisher">1.0</article-version>
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    <subj-group subj-group-type="heading">
      <subject>article</subject>
    </subj-group>
  </article-categories>
  <title-group>
    <article-title xml:lang="en">Power Competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran: An Analysis</article-title>
  </title-group>
<contrib-group>
  <contrib contrib-type="author" seq="1" corresp="yes">
    <name>
      <surname>Afzal</surname>
      <given-names>Naila</given-names>
    </name>
    <role vocab="credit" vocab-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/" vocab-term="Conceptualization" vocab-term-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/contributor-roles/conceptualization/">Conceptualization</role>
    <role vocab="credit" vocab-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/" vocab-term="Writing – original draft" vocab-term-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/contributor-roles/writing-original-draft/">Writing – original draft</role>
    <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1"/>
    <xref ref-type="corresp" rid="cor1"/>
  </contrib>
  <aff id="aff1">
    <label>1</label>
    <institution-wrap>
      <institution>Department of Political Science, Gujranwala Institute of Future Technology, Gujranwala</institution>
    </institution-wrap>
    <named-content content-type="author-role">Lecturer</named-content>
    <addr-line>Punjab</addr-line>
    <country>Pakistan</country>
  </aff>
</contrib-group>
<author-notes>
  <corresp id="cor1">Corresponding Author: Naila Afzal, Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Gujranwala Institute of Future Technology, Gujranwala, Punjab, Pakistan.</corresp>
<fn fn-type="COI-statement" id="fn-coi">
  <p>The second phase consists of proxy wars,
resulting from Arab Spring 2011. Iran
invested in the Assad regime in Syria, while
revolutionaries were supported by Saudi
Arabia to control Iran’s influence.
Saudi Arabia and Iran took the Syrian
conflict as being weapon. However, there is
not any role of the Syrian war in Saudi-Iran
rivalry. Syria emerged as a central
battleground to control the regional system
instead of becoming an instrument of one
hegemon state. Saudi Arabia seized this
opportunity and strength itself in Syria and
Lebanon and tried to change the post-2003
order. It even tried to weaken Iran and
Syria, but there were also sharp divisions
within the Sunnis, with Qatar supporting
groups linked to the Muslim Brotherhood,
and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates funding opposition groups, which
was diverted. The Saudis&apos; goal in Syria was
to provoke American intervention so they
kept the Americans with them. For Iran, the
2011 coup was an existing threat to its ally
Syria, instead of viewing Saudi Arabia as its
main adversary, Iran used to focus on the
United States and its ally Israel. Iran argued
that the Gulf States were behind the regime
change in Iran, government especially felt
vulnerable in the immediate aftermath of
the 2009 Green Movement and before the
2015 &quot;Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA)&quot; or &quot;Iran nuclear deal&quot; that would
have imposed sanctions. Now the power
competition in Syria is between Iran and
Israel instead of Iran and Saudi Arabia. It
depends on commitment; Iran has fully
invested in the battlefield. Many Quds
forces and Hezbollah personnel were killed
during the war. Iran established many nonstate actors to suppress Assad. Saudi Arabia
felt that the US would not support more in
Syria, so it would be better to leave Syriawithout more loss. Assad again wants to
come into power, and he is not happy with
Iranian strength. Now Saudis are thinking
of supporting Assad to counter Iran in Syria For more than one decade the Republic of
Yemen has faced a number of armed
conflicts, and multiple internal and external
militant groups are part of armed conflict.
Succinctly, armed conflicts fragmented the
nation into different groups, and there is
not any proper government structure in
Yemen. The territorial dissolution of
Yemen has been alarming for the
international community and the United
States. According to policymakers, the
failure of the state can be of encouraging
terrorist groups in the region. It can
destabilize international shipping lanes
near Bab el Mandeb which provide an
opportunity for Iran to create a threat to
Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia and Iran have had regional
rivalries for almost more than four decades.
Power competition between the two states
creates security challenges in the whole
region. The proxy war between the two
states has continued in different regions of
the Middle East including Bahrain, Yemen,
Lebanon, and Syria. Muhammad Bin
Salman is frightened of the burgeoning
Iranian strength to dominate the region. US
antagonism with Iran encourages MBS to
issue strong statements against Iran (Nawaz
&amp; others, 2021).
Iran&apos;s ally Houthi tribe in Yemen
planned a coup against President Abed
Rabbu Mansour Hadi with the help of
former president Ali Saleh, who was
backed by Saudi Arabia. On September 21,
2014, Houthi tribes overthrew the Hadi
government and held power over state
institutions. In 2015 Saudi Arabia launched
Operation Decisive Storm (ODS) against
Iranian presence in Yemen, on the back of
Houthi tribes.
MBS once said that there is no chance of
understanding between Saudi Arabia and
Iran. MBS further said that the international
community should enforce more sanctions
on Iran because it is based on extremist
ideology. Iran merely wants to control the
Muslims in the Arab world. He said, ‘‘I will
not wait until battle comes to Saudi Arabia,
but we will work on that battlefield in Iran’’
(Baban, 2017). </p>
</fn>
<fn fn-type="ethics-statement" id="fn-ethics">
  <p>This study did not require formal ethics approval.</p>
</fn>
<fn fn-type="data-availability-statement" id="fn-data">
  <p>Data sharing is not applicable to this article.</p>
</fn>
</author-notes>
<pub-date pub-type="epub" date-type="pub" publication-format="electronic">
  <day>30</day>
  <month>06</month>
  <year>2021</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="collection">
  <month>06</month>
  <year>2021</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date date-type="pub" publication-format="print">
  <day>03</day>
  <month>10</month>
  <year>2022</year>
</pub-date>
  <volume>4</volume>
  <issue>2</issue>
  <season>Spring</season>
  <fpage>1</fpage>
  <lpage>7</lpage>
  <history>
    <date date-type="accepted">
      <day>03</day>
      <month>10</month>
      <year>2022</year>
    </date>
  </history>
<funding-group>
  <funding-statement>
<p>The authors received no specific funding for this work.</p>
  </funding-statement>
</funding-group>
<permissions>
  <copyright-year>2021</copyright-year>
  <copyright-holder>Humanity Publications</copyright-holder>
  <license license-type="open-access" xml:lang="en" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">
    <license-p>This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.</license-p>
  </license>
</permissions>
<self-uri content-type="text/html" xlink:href="https://gfprjournal.com/article/power-competition-between-saudi-arabia-and-iran-an-analysis"/>
<self-uri content-type="pdf" xlink:href="https://gfprjournal.com/pdf/gfpr/j4DqDDGiCr.pdf"/>
<supplementary-material id="suppl-pdf" content-type="pdf" xlink:href="https://gfprjournal.com/pdf/gfpr/j4DqDDGiCr.pdf">
  <label>PDF</label>
  <caption>
    <title>Full Text PDF</title>
  </caption>
</supplementary-material>
  <abstract>
    <p>The aim of this study is to explore the craze of power competition in the Middle East. Today Middle East has become the hub of conflicts. Power competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran has jeopardized the security dilemma for the whole region. There are many other factors of regional conflicts but the Shia-Sunni factor dominated not only media as well as policy analysts. This research is qualitative in nature. The results of the study found that regional conflicts gave birth to irregular armies that are fighting for their nation-state still on an old pattern. Wars and violence have also victimized the youth and children. In the case of Middle East politics, the Saudi-Iran rivalry has been contested hotly.</p>
  </abstract>
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  <kwd>Saudi-Iran Relations</kwd>
  <kwd>US Invasion</kwd>
  <kwd>Saudi-Yemen War</kwd>
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</front>
<body>
<sec id="sec-1">
  <title>Introduction</title>
<p>The security dilemma in the Middle East
has created a threat to its neighbouring
states. To understand the dynamics of
Middle East conflicts it is necessary to
examine some alternative frameworks that
will help to understand the current regional
politics. Today&apos;s power struggle is based on
sectarianism including Shia, and Sunni
contests in the Middle East. But for nuanced
reasons, there are many other factors of
regional conflicts but the Shia-Sunni factor
dominated not only media as well as policy
analysts. Looking at killing in Lebanon, Iraq,
Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria anyone can
easily guess the reason Sectarianism has
been the major factor of regional conflicts
and power politics in all these states. Media
outlets of the region including television
stations and newspapers in Saudi Arabia,
the Sunni Jihadi website, and Al-Manar
television of Hezbollah, all represent the
struggle for sectarianism. So sectarianism is
of crucial importance to understanding
contemporary regional power politics.
However, these sectarian conflicts are new
because the Shia-Sunni community lived
in harmony for many years. Sectarian
conflicts have not been seen in the Islamic
history of the Middle East. Conflicts
between Arabs were not sectarian but
ideological. The civil war in Lebanon was
sectarian in which Christians contested
Muslims, but Shia and Sunni were on one
side. The Iran-Iraq war 1980s was not
sectarian but regional in which Arabs
fought against the Persian nation while
Syrian Arabs were with Iran, Arab-Israel
wars were fought in the name of Islam, not
sectarianism. The Shia-Sunni factor can be
changed because it is not centuries long.
The complex regional conflicts of the
Middle East can be traced by understanding
the regional players including state and
non-state actors where Saudi Arabia and
Iran played the key role. The cold war
between Saudi Arabia and Iran left a
horrible impact on the region that
destabilized the region. Yet both states will
not fight militarily. However, their contest influenced the domestic political system of
weak states of the region. Regional
differences and the craze of power politics
of Saudi Arabia piped the region into wars.
Iran and Saudi Arabia relations were
initially cordial when diplomatic ties first
started in the early 1930s. However, a
significant change in the dynamics was
brought about by the Iranian Revolution of
1979, which transformed Iran into an
Islamic Republic with revolutionary ideals
that opposed the already existing regional
order. Iran and Saudi Arabia&apos;s
confrontation was caused by a variety of
factors, including geopolitics, religious
differences, and economic concerns
(Gause, 2014)</p>
</sec>
<sec id="sec-2">
  <title>Saudi-Iran Power Competition in the Historical Perspectives</title>
<p>The present rivalry between Saudi Arabia
and Iran has been about four decades.
Despite all serious efforts, no one could
solve their issues. The rivalry began with
the Iranian revolution of 1979, while for
some it is ancient since Arab-Persian
antagonism; some argued rivalry began
between the two states with the emergence
of sectarianism (Shia, Sunni). Anyhow two
major developments cannot be ignored in
the contemporary conflict
? Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran and
? The American invasion of Iraq
However US intervention in Iraq upset
regional security; consequently, filling the
vacuum opened the door for both
aggressive interventions of rival states.
According to Charles Tripp and Shahram
Chubin, there are many other factors of
Saudi-Iran rivalry besides sectarianism:
? Geopolitical differences especially
demographic and geographic have
played an important role in decision
making
? Each state in the Middle East has a
desire to play a leading role in the
Gulf region.
? Ethnic, cultural, and sectarian
differences also exacerbated the
power competition.
Additionally, the 1979 revolution led to a
fundamental threat to the Gulf region, since
the revolution, the Iranian government
claimed to be an Islamic authority that
directly threatened Saudi Arabia&apos;s interests.
While being the guardian of Medina and
Mecca Saudi Arabia has an integral place in
the Muslim world. Both states have
Ideological and geographical differences
that feed into each other, and these
differences exacerbated the Islamic
revolution in Iran in 1979, and Iran became
a republic. In the 1930s both states met to
have close ties because of the Hajj practice,
where Persian goods were encouraged
whether it was carpets or settlement of
small-scale Persian communities. But after
the Second World War Iran had cordial ties
with the United States that Saudi Arabia
couldn&apos;t compete with because of the
minor population and military strength.
Saudi Aramco was established in the early
1930s and proved to be a bridge between
Saudi-US relations and help to enhance
military ties between the two states. The
two states were committed to fighting
against Soviet communism, and Egypt&apos;s
threat, and to maintaining the flow of oil.
But relations between Iran and Saudi
Arabia became worse after the British
proclamation of departure from the Gulf
region in 1968. Because of a new cold war,
new competition began in the Middle East
over regional leadership, Gulf security, and
control of OPEC Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries. (Ervand, 1999).
Therefore America had expected to use
Iran and Saudi Arabia against communism
successfully. According to Keynoush, in
comparison to Saudi Arabia, Iran&apos;s welltrained military and larger economy played
a central role in this policy. Although Iran
had been seen as the West&apos;s policeman in
the Gulf, Saudi Arabia did not see Iran as an
enemy, or an ally. Despite all efforts of Iran
to attract Arab monarchs after the
settlement of Bahrain issue all smaller states resisted Iran&apos;s interference in the
Gulf security pact. Saudi leadership was
worried about friendly relations between
Iran and the US. Shah Muhammad Reza
Pahlavi had a personal relationship with
President Nixon. The USA trusted in Shah
that he would eventually reduce the foreign
presence in the Gulf region. Tension was
raised quite after the Iranian revolution, in
Saudi Arabia when the Eastern Province
Shia dominated performed an illegal
ideological procession on the holiday
Ashura, crowd carrying Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeneini&apos;s pictures, anti-America, and
anti-Saudi slogan were raised (Khalifa,
2018). The situation then became even
tenser when Saudi authorities dispersed
the crowd by using power. In 1979 when
the USSR invaded Afghanistan, this was a
valuable opportunity for Saudi Arabia to
demonstrate its Islamic legitimacy in the
world as well as in the region. For that
purpose, the Saudi Government began to
support travel and training troops. That
raised tension between the two states.
Iran-Iraq war 1980 also known as enforced
war in Iran. The Gulf Cooperation Council
was established in 1981 to save the region
from the effects of the Iran-Iraq war. GCC
was established by six states Oman, Kuwait,
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab
Emirates. Even Saudi Arabia had aided Iraq
with $1 billion each month. On the eve of
Hajj Iranian pilgrims protested against the
Saudi government and 450 Irani pilgrims
died in this protest. Iran protested against
this incident and suggested that Iran should
be the custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.
In turn, Riyadh decreased the number of
Irani pilgrims from the next year (Zarei &amp;
Zarrin, 2008). The relations improved
between the two states after Khomeini&apos;s
death in 1989, during the presidency of Ali
Akbar Hashemi 1989-1997, and more
cooperation by President Mohammad
Khatami (1997-2005). In 1995 King
Abdullah supported the Iranian president
on the eve of the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC) in 1997 in Pakistan. He
assured him to remove US troops to
contain Iran. Rafsanjani also promised to
ensure peace for Irani pilgrims during Hajj.
Both leaders agreed to bring peace to the
region, even Khatami was the first
president who visited Riyadh officially in
1999 (Gause, 2014).</p>
</sec>
<sec id="sec-3">
  <title>Saudi-Iran Relations in the 21st Century</title>
<p>A turn comes at the beginning of the 21st
century after the 9/11 incident. To solve
regional and global issues of terrorism,
illegal immigration, money laundering, and
drug trafficking, in 2001 and 2002, Iran and
Saudi Arabia signed an agreement. IranIraq War and Saudi tensions with Iran
enhanced the US role in the region. The US
played an important role in Saudi-Iran
antagonism. Eventually, Iran was also
determined to remove foreign pressure in
the region, but Saudi Arabia created
obstacles to achieve this goal. According to
Saudi Arabia, Iran had created mistrust at
the time of the revolution in 1979 with the
aim of overthrowing the Saudi monarchy
(Jathol, Qazafi &amp; Husain, 2017). It is also
crucial to know that Riyadh better
understands an asymmetric difference
between Iran and Saudi Arabia for a long,
such as military strength, population, and
industrial capacity. To some analysts,
geopolitical competition increased after
Iraq declined (Pasha &amp; others, 2021).
For Riyadh, the resurgence of Shia
power in Iraq in 2003 and the nuclear
power of Tehran had upset the balance of
power in the region. US inclination towards
Iran also frightened Saudi leadership
because of the Khomeini ideology against
the monarchy system and belief in political
authority. President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad was also following the same
line. The US invasion of Iraq also disturbed
the equilibrium of the Shia-Sunni state in
the region. Ahmad Hassan Al Bark raised
the Shia dominance in Iraq which was in
liaison with coreligionists in Tehran.
Additionally, Shia dominance in Iraq and
Tehran could also be mobilized by the Shia
community in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi
Arabia (Farzaneh, 2007).The Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006 in
Lebanon also bred sectarian tension.
Hezbollah&apos;s support of Iran had been
considered a threat to Shia-Sunni
asymmetric in the region. The Arab leader&apos;s
talk to their public is called the &quot;Arab street&quot;
strategy. After the 2005 elections, Iran
increased its activity in the Middle East
under the leadership of Ahmadinejad. In
2006 Iran supported Hezbollah which
increased rise Iran&apos;s popularity (Golkar,
2015</p>
</sec>
<sec id="sec-4">
  <title>Iran and Saudi Arabia&apos;s Relationship</title>
<p>The Saudi Arabia and Iran relationship can
be divided into the following four phases
since 2003.                                        <bold>Phase: 1:- US Invasion of Iraq and
Saudi-Iran Befuddlement</bold>                                                                        The First phase began with the US invasion
of Iraq in 2003 which imbalanced the
regional order. After the US invasion of
Iraq in 2003, Conflict had been exaggerated
between Iran and Saudi Arabia due to the
multiparty involvement of the region
including the Iraqi Government, Bahrain,
Houthi tribes of Yemen, Iraqi Shia, the
Syrian regime, and Saudi Arabia&apos;s allies Gulf
countries. The new stakeholders
introduced new sets of interests whether it
is primary, secondary, or invested.
Gradually conflict moved from the
leadership level to the top-down fashion of
the two countries&apos; populations which made
it more complex (Farzaneh, 2007).
Although Iran has more influence in Iraq
than Saudi Arabia. For decades Iran had
invested in opposition forces of Iraq.
Anyhow leader of a powerful Shia Political
Party, Ammar Al-Hakim…. Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq became more powerful in
Iraq than in Iran, Ammar Al-Hakim refused
to do the bidding of Iran, like the Sadrist
movement. More grief for Iran is that Najaf
attempted to be the centre of the Shia
world. Iran doesn&apos;t want to see Iraq as an
autonomous polity. Qassem Soleimani who
was an expert in strategy made a blunder in
pursuing this objective. Actually, it was
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri AL-Maliki, who
was an Iranian ally, and his sectarian
policies became the cause of the Islamic
rise, and decline of Mosul (Khalifa, 2018).</p>
</sec>
<sec id="sec-5">
  <title>Phase IV: Two-Party Confrontation</title>
<p>Tension escalated between the two states
when Saudi Arabia executed a top Shia
cleric Shiekh Nimr al-Nimr on January 2,
2016, convicted of terrorism. Saudi Arabia
announced that it has executed 47
dissidents and militants, the news widely
condemned. Nimra Al-Nimr was born in
Saudi Arabia in a Shia family in 1959 and
became the supreme leader of the Shia
majority in Iran. Ayatollah Seyyed Ali
Khamenei strongly condemned and said
Saudi Arabia must face divine vengeance
for the cleric&apos;s execution (Wilkin, 2017). The
next day Iranian protestors attacked the
Saudi consulate and Embassy in Iran and
burned them. In response, Saudi Arabia
and its allies (Kuwait, United Arab Emirates,
and Qatar) expelled Iranian ambassadors
and downgraded diplomatic relations on
the 4th of January. On January 7, 2016, Iran
accused Saudi Arabia of bombing the
Iranian embassy in Yemen. After two days,
the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia
proclaimed that ‘‘additional measures are to
be taken against Iran if it continues with its
current policies&apos;&apos; (Al-Arabia News, 2021)</p>
</sec>
<sec id="sec-6">
  <title>Conclusion</title>
<p>Since the revolution in 1979, Iran has not
only fighting for the interests of Shia
Muslims but also for Muslims&apos; interests
against Israel and the USA. While also
supporting Shia organizations including
Assad&apos;s regime in Syria, Shia militia in Iraq
as well and Hezbollah in Lebanon that
fueled sectarianism in the entire region.
The menace of sectarianism fueled more
after the 2011 Arab Uprising. A series of
protests began with the Tunisia Uprisingagainst the authoritarian regime of the
region which soon spread across the region
of the Middle East. However, it did not end
as a result of democratic government while
leeched the Arab world more
authoritarianism and civil wars. The most
destructive protest was in Syria in terms of
loss of lives. Assad&apos;s regime in Syria
responded to the popular demands for
reforms with coercion and violence that
triggered historical antipathy among Syrian
Sunnis. The civil war in Syria swiftly
became the battleground for the local
rivalries of Saudi Arabia and Iran. Riyadh
supported Sunni rebels while Tehran
supported Assad&apos;s regime against the Sunni
group of Syria. Riyadh condemned Tehran
for advancing its agenda of sectarianism
while in practice supporting Sunni rebels,
who were fighting against an illegitimate
regime that also advanced sectarianism in
the region. The Civil War in Syria paved the
way for the &quot;Islamic State of Iraq and Syria&quot;
(ISIS). In fact, the dimension of sectarianism
is more political than ideological. After the
fall of Saddam&apos;s regime in Iraq, the process
of sectarianism was further reinforced
amid the Arab Spring which encouraged
Saudi Arabia and Iran to expand their
influence in Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen.
Saudi Arabia and Iran are both fighting
proxy wars throughout the Middle East.
Both have supported rebels and dissidents
with religious sectarian fatwas, planning
advice, strategic guidance, intelligence
equipment, training, financial assistance,
and heavy weapons. Repercussions of their
competition have not merely engulfed the
Middle East but the whole Muslim World.
For instance, it has spread vertically and
horizontally and gave birth to the hyperterrorist organization of Daesh, additionally
a humanitarian crisis that increased the
flow of migrants even towards European
states. Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen are
caught in an unending crisis, and this
situation will not be good for the Middle
East as well as for the whole world</p>
</sec>
<sec id="sec-7">
  <title>Recommendations</title>
<p>Both states should promote regional
cooperation and alliances that include both
Saudi Arabia and Iran. Constructive
regional organizations can help address
common challenges, such as economic
development, environmental issues, and
counterterrorism efforts. There should
develop and strengthen regional conflict
resolution mechanisms that can help
manage and de-escalate conflicts when
they arise. The recommendation of the
study is that both states should develop and
strengthen regional conflict resolution
mechanisms that can help manage and deescalate conflicts when they arise</p>
</sec>
</body>
<back>
<fn-group content-type="conflict-of-interest">
  <title>Conflict of Interest</title>
  <fn fn-type="conflict">
<p>The second phase consists of proxy wars,
resulting from Arab Spring 2011. Iran
invested in the Assad regime in Syria, while
revolutionaries were supported by Saudi
Arabia to control Iran’s influence.
Saudi Arabia and Iran took the Syrian
conflict as being weapon. However, there is
not any role of the Syrian war in Saudi-Iran
rivalry. Syria emerged as a central
battleground to control the regional system
instead of becoming an instrument of one
hegemon state. Saudi Arabia seized this
opportunity and strength itself in Syria and
Lebanon and tried to change the post-2003
order. It even tried to weaken Iran and
Syria, but there were also sharp divisions
within the Sunnis, with Qatar supporting
groups linked to the Muslim Brotherhood,
and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates funding opposition groups, which
was diverted. The Saudis&apos; goal in Syria was
to provoke American intervention so they
kept the Americans with them. For Iran, the
2011 coup was an existing threat to its ally
Syria, instead of viewing Saudi Arabia as its
main adversary, Iran used to focus on the
United States and its ally Israel. Iran argued
that the Gulf States were behind the regime
change in Iran, government especially felt
vulnerable in the immediate aftermath of
the 2009 Green Movement and before the
2015 &quot;Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA)&quot; or &quot;Iran nuclear deal&quot; that would
have imposed sanctions. Now the power
competition in Syria is between Iran and
Israel instead of Iran and Saudi Arabia. It
depends on commitment; Iran has fully
invested in the battlefield. Many Quds
forces and Hezbollah personnel were killed
during the war. Iran established many nonstate actors to suppress Assad. Saudi Arabia
felt that the US would not support more in
Syria, so it would be better to leave Syriawithout more loss. Assad again wants to
come into power, and he is not happy with
Iranian strength. Now Saudis are thinking
of supporting Assad to counter Iran in Syria</p><p>For more than one decade the Republic of
Yemen has faced a number of armed
conflicts, and multiple internal and external
militant groups are part of armed conflict.
Succinctly, armed conflicts fragmented the
nation into different groups, and there is
not any proper government structure in
Yemen. The territorial dissolution of
Yemen has been alarming for the
international community and the United
States. According to policymakers, the
failure of the state can be of encouraging
terrorist groups in the region. It can
destabilize international shipping lanes
near Bab el Mandeb which provide an
opportunity for Iran to create a threat to
Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia and Iran have had regional
rivalries for almost more than four decades.
Power competition between the two states
creates security challenges in the whole
region. The proxy war between the two
states has continued in different regions of
the Middle East including Bahrain, Yemen,
Lebanon, and Syria. Muhammad Bin
Salman is frightened of the burgeoning
Iranian strength to dominate the region. US
antagonism with Iran encourages MBS to
issue strong statements against Iran (Nawaz
&amp; others, 2021).
Iran&apos;s ally Houthi tribe in Yemen
planned a coup against President Abed
Rabbu Mansour Hadi with the help of
former president Ali Saleh, who was
backed by Saudi Arabia. On September 21,
2014, Houthi tribes overthrew the Hadi
government and held power over state
institutions. In 2015 Saudi Arabia launched
Operation Decisive Storm (ODS) against
Iranian presence in Yemen, on the back of
Houthi tribes.
MBS once said that there is no chance of
understanding between Saudi Arabia and
Iran. MBS further said that the international
community should enforce more sanctions
on Iran because it is based on extremist
ideology. Iran merely wants to control the
Muslims in the Arab world. He said, ‘‘I will
not wait until battle comes to Saudi Arabia,
but we will work on that battlefield in Iran’’
(Baban, 2017).</p>
  </fn>
</fn-group>
<fn-group content-type="ethics-statement">
  <title>Ethics Statement</title>
  <fn fn-type="ethics">
<p>This study did not require formal ethics approval.</p>
  </fn>
</fn-group>
<fn-group content-type="data-availability">
  <title>Data Availability</title>
  <fn fn-type="data-availability-statement">
<p>Data sharing is not applicable to this article.</p>
  </fn>
</fn-group>
<app-group>
  <app id="app-suppl">
    <title>Supplementary Materials</title>
<supplementary-material id="suppl-pdf" content-type="pdf" xlink:href="https://gfprjournal.com/pdf/gfpr/j4DqDDGiCr.pdf">
  <label>PDF</label>
  <caption>
    <title>Full Text PDF</title>
  </caption>
</supplementary-material>
  </app>
</app-group>
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