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Pakistan's Alignment with the US: An Analysis of Costs and Benefits

Abstract: *There have been many ups and downs in relations between the US and Pakistan, with divergent and convergent concerns. Each country has tried to influence the other with its own specific needs and goals. The main goal of Pakistan's alliance with the US was to secure its security against India and to receive significant financial and military support from the US. In this context Pakistan joined the US sponsored alliances. The paper attempts to examine the impacts of alliances on Pakistan during its alignment with the US.*

Key Words: US, Pakistan, Alliances, Costs and Benefits

Introduction

Pakistan and India appeared on the map on August 1947 and became sovereign and independent States, which was a once-in-a-lifetime event in the history of the subcontinent. The two independent countries emerged as a result of the partition of the Indian subcontinent. The division was the culmination of a struggle of sustained and burning freedom of the subcontinent's Muslims that had decided to part ways from the Hindus. Muslims, therefore, had to jump a struggle to escape from the Hindu domination that was blamed and vengeful after the British had departure the subcontinent. Hindus and Congress members, in particular, were dissatisfied with India's split it had pulled the downtrodden Muslim community from

their dominance. The Congress politicians did their best to stop the partition of India and eventually accepted it with the belief that a turn of events might one day undo the partition (Rabbani, [2015](#)).

As a result, Pakistan was founded in a state of chaos and crisis. Because of the antagonistic stance of Indian politics, it has experienced security issues since the beginning of its existence. They have committed every opportunity to stop the partition of the sub-continent. Pakistan was greatly in need of foreign assistance both in the economic and military spheres for its survival. These continuous threats forced Pakistan to look for ways to protect its territorial integrity (Venkatramani, [1982](#)). At the beginning of the 1950s, the Marshall Plan was a programme started by the United

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States. "which was to recover several of the damaged economies of the second World War. In this regard, the Asian countries also received support and economic assistance. After the partition, the United States extended an invitation to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to visit Washington. The invitation was also extended by the Soviet Union, Liaquat Ali Khan, on the other hand, preferred to visit Washington, confirming Pakistan's preference for the West. The Korean crisis in 1951 and Liaquat Ali Khan's visit to the United States in 1950 paved the way for Pakistan and the United States to establish a close relationship. In 1953, the two countries signed an agreement to understand the point of view of each other and the scenario was ready for cooperation. Ghulam Muhammad paid a visit to the US in November 1953. A military agreement between Pakistan and the United States was declared to be necessary following the visit (Rabbani, [2015](#)).

Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact a year later, in 1955. Following the signing of these two Agreements, Pakistan became an ally of the United States in Asia. Pakistan had solidified its support for the US and appeared to be acting on American directives. In order to provide Pakistan with military assistance, the United States and Pakistan signed a bilateral cooperation agreement in 1959. Pakistan received \$ 1.5 billion in military aid from 1954 to 1965. The total sum of economic help and other loans is \$3 billion. On May 19, 1954, Pakistan and the US signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. In the same year, Pakistan joined the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization. SEATO was primarily established to combat communism, which was posing an increasing threat to the Western economic system. The United States persuaded her allies to assist her in combating communism's growing influence, which posed a serious danger to the western capitalist system. They needed to combat communism in collaboration,

Pakistan had no choice but to combat communism, but she did not receive any collective action guarantee from these pacts against her by attack of foreign aggression (Rose and Hassian, 1987).

The reasons for security concerns arose as a result of joining the SEATO and CENTO. Because of India's continual antagonism, Pakistan needed allies who could support it both morally and financially in order to secure its borders. It was clear that Pakistani authorities were primarily driven by a desire to strengthen their defense against India when they signed these agreements. By entering SEATO and CENTO, Pakistan benefited to some extent. Pakistan's membership in SEATO and CENTO drew it closer to Iran and Turkey finally bringing the road to the creation of RCD (Arora, and Grover, [1995](#)).

However, if Pakistan had won its membership and session membership, she had to pay a high price for her membership of these pacts. After the adhesion of Pakistan to SEATO and CENTO, it lost freedom in diplomatic and foreign policy orientation. The diplomatic cost has also been high, Pakistan's diplomatic freedom was revoked, and its status as a non-aligned country was shattered. It was met with hostility from both the USSR and the Arab world. The US, on the other hand, preferred to support India. During the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict, the United States helped India militarily. The manner in which the US expands military support to India, as well as the speed with which it does so, have aroused numerous concerns in Pakistan. Pakistan's status as an American ally was harmed by the US's tilt toward India, which harmed reciprocal relations between the two countries. American behavior had become instrumental that compelled Pakistan to the need to review the policy considerations. It developed a sense of suspicion in Pakistan that the USA had no longer sincere to the commitments of the military and allied

pacts. As a result, political leaders in Pakistan also felt to search for new allies in the region to meet its security needs (Malik, 2008).

Despite Pakistan's concerns, the US expanded military support to India in 1963. The US did not consider Pakistan's reservation. India deployed weaponry against Pakistan when it attacked it in 1965. The USA further aggravated the situation by refusing to help Pakistan. It weakened Pakistan's position because Pakistan was dependent on the weapons from the US. The United States' engagement in the 1965 war, as well as its arms supplies to India severely weakened Pakistan's defence capabilities and served to fuel Indian aggression against Pakistan. In Pakistan, animosity had grown as a result of the US engagement in the 1965 war and its pro-Indian attitude. The people were immensely dissatisfied with the United States for abandoning their most dependable ally alone during a hard time; as a result, Pakistan decided to turn on the side of China which had emerged as a powerful nation by then. The tendency of Pakistan toward China infuriated the United States. But the attitude of the USA had left Pakistan with no other choice except to search for a reliable friend. Pakistan built close relations with China, a move that the US found repulsive (Rabbani, 2015).

Historical Perspective

Pakistan was created on August 14, 1947, when it declared its independence from the British Colonial Empire, with the partition plan the Indian subcontinent was divided along ethnic and religious lines, and Pakistan created in those adjacent territories with a majority of Muslim populations. Thus Pakistan had a 70 million people of Muslim population while there was a large Hindu community in India, which made up 15% of the population, there was also a sizable Muslim community. The provinces of Sind, Punjab, Baluchistan, and the

Northwest Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.) on India's western border, as well as East Bengal Province on India's eastern coast, were all included in Pakistan. Eastern Pakistan and Western Pakistan were separated by 1,000 miles of Indian Territory (Sattar, 2010). India inherited much of the infrastructure of the colonial authority, whereas Pakistan gained only a small portion of its assets. However, in comparison to India, Pakistan's land regions were less developed and had minimal administrative infrastructure. Following World War Two, both countries recovered some of the military assets left over. The main problems that were confronted by Pakistan was security issues, a lack of infrastructure, and low financial resources were all present at the time of the country's independence. As a result of the establishment of two independent governments and the division of nations along ethnoreligious lines, widespread migration between the two countries took place as well as ethnic cleansing, riots, and looting. The partition of the subcontinent had been a difficult matter, with both India and Pakistan disputing the distribution of assets and territories. Kashmir was a sensitive issue because both India and Pakistan claimed it as their integral part. The issue resulted in a brief war in 1948, with India gaining control of one-third of Pakistan's occupied Kashmir area and Pakistan losing the remaining two-thirds. Although Pakistan's concerns with India and efforts to strengthen ties with the United States have dominated its foreign policy, its relationships with the West, particularly with the United Kingdom and the United States, have been essential in increasing its foreign support. Pakistan joined the Commonwealth of Nations after gaining independence in 1947. Post-independence Pakistan adopted a pro-west policy while, the Indian government adopted a non-aligned foreign strategy (Markey, 2013). India was neutral at this

time and was part of the Non-Aligned Movement. In setting up new economic and political systems the government faced several challenges. It attempted to organize the armed forces and bureaucracy, resettle the Mohajirs (Indian Muslim refugees), and maintain the distribution and balance of power within central and provincial governments. These efforts were undermined and criticized by provincial leaders, who often challenged central government authority, and frequent protests, communal riots, and disturbances among the masses (Kux, [2002](#)). Jinnah's untimely demise in September 1948 further escalated the situation and the government could not resolve these difficulties. Liaquat Ali Khan established good ties with the United States when visited Washington in 1950. Prior to this, Pakistan's foreign policy was non-aligned and had no formal ties to either the United States or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the two main Cold War foes. On the other hand, Pakistan established an alliance with the US in 1953 and started getting financial and military support. The Cold War led to the development of Pakistan's relations with the United States of America (Ayoob, [1965](#)).

Positive Impacts of alliances on Pakistan

Military Aid

By February 1951, American planners had identified the free world's strategic strong flanks in Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, believing that the most successful military defence of the region would entail strong flanks in those countries. As a result, a rapid build-up of Pakistani forces was "of primary importance," aided by military weapons sent to Pakistan. Only 13 tanks with a forty to fifty-hour engine life were available for Pakistan at that time to combat the Indian Army which was preparing to strike Pakistan's borders in 1950 and 1951. Pakistan was given limited economic help in

February 1952 as defensive support. It was able to replenish some of its supplies of ammunition and replacement parts, preventing Nehru from leaving for the war. It took six years from the initial steps towards security ties to the election of World War II hero and grand strategist General Dwight D. Eisenhower as president, ushering in a new era of close US-Pakistani security ties, before Pakistan's geostrategic location at the crossroads of Central, South, and Southwest Asia was recognized (Hassan, [2016](#)). General Ayub Khan informed Vice President Nixon during a trip to Karachi in December 1952 that the Soviet Union would use "India as a cat's paw for establishing a big presence in South Asia," a prediction that was realized in 1971. Western nations were developing a "northern-tier" approach to collective security through NATO's extension to Western powers. When the Eisenhower administration invited Ayub Khan to Washington in October 1953, he accepted. They were adamant that helping and tying Pakistan into bilateral and global security arrangements was in their shared interests, first with the US in May 1954 and subsequently with SEATO in September 1954. Because of Indochina, Southeast Asia remained a top priority (Hasant, [2011](#)). The Baghdad Pact (renamed CENTO in 1958) was established in September 1955. In March 1959, a bilateral cooperation deal was signed with the US. The government of the United States of America believes that Pakistan's independence and integrity are crucial to both its own interests and the stability of the world. "Pakistan would stand by you if you stand Pakistan," President Ayub Khan assured the US. Subsidies, the sale of weapons, and credits for commercial purchases were examples of American overt military assistance, as well as training at institutions for foreign military personnel" (Khan, [2010](#)).

\$650 million went towards military subsidies, \$619 million went towards

defense support, and \$55 million went towards cash or commercial purchases. From 1954 through 1961, arms sales were at an all-time high. As a result, Pakistan was successful in establishing a credible deterrent against India and Afghanistan during the ten-year period 1955-65 by modernizing its military forces. Influential lobbyists in anti-Pakistan states and superpower globalism began to form links (Coutto and Sunawar, 2015). The Military Assistance Program was curtailed first, followed by an attempt to devalue the Lowering "rent" on the Peshawar facility will increase its importance. The triumph of the Democratic Party in the November 1960 elections (which, according to some analysts, had "lost" China to the US in the 1970s, President John F. Kennedy's efforts to "win" over "nonaligned" India and his efforts to "lose" Iran and Afghanistan culminated in a turning point for Pakistan-US security ties. A rush of US military aid to Pakistan following the 1962 India-China war, which India initiated in an effort to deny China its historical and geopolitical South Asian power status, negated the effects of earlier US aid to Pakistan, forcing Pakistan to turn to its north Asian neighbor, China, to mend fences, starting with the demarcation of the common border. After that, a 300-mile border will be constructed, and then an air link will be created (Baloch, 2007).

After the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War both Pakistan and India were subject to an arms embargo, imposed by the US on Pakistan – after the Pakistani air force gained the upper hand and the Pakistani ground forces halted the invaders courtesy to US equipment. Although the Soviet Union lifted its embargo a week after the fighting began, up until 1967, when it was partially lifted to permit the sale of some spare parts, the US ban persisted. Pakistan was forced to turn to China as a result, and the country agreed to provide three newly formed Pakistani divisions with tanks as well as MIG 19 (renamed F-6) aircraft for its air force, as well

as several quick patrol boats for its navy. Assistance to the Military First, the programme was slashed, then an attempt was made to downplay the relevance of the Peshawar facility by cutting its "rent." The Democratic Party's victory in the November 1960 elections (which, according to some analysts, "lost" China to the US and was to "lose" Iran and Afghanistan in the 1970s) and President John F. Kennedy's efforts to "win" over "nonaligned" India led to a turning point in Pakistan-US security relations. A rush of US military aid to Pakistan following the 1962 India-China war, which India initiated in an effort to deny China its historical and geopolitical South Asian power status, negated the effects of earlier US aid to Pakistan, forcing Pakistan to turn to its north Asian neighbor, China, to mend fences, starting with the demarcation of the common border. In France, Mirages and submarines are well-known. In 1968, the Soviet Union offered to build a naval base at Gwadar in exchange for \$30 million in armaments, Mi8 helicopters, and cars. Under Indian pressure, the Soviet Union cut off all military shipments to Pakistan, but when the draught of an Indo-Soviet treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation was being reviewed in 1969, the Soviet Union agreed to build a steel plant in Karachi. The United States and West Germany have already disregarded the feasibility of a steel mill project (Hussain and Abbas, 2018).

Based on recommendations from the State and Defense Departments, President Dwight D. Eisenhower decided in February 1954 that Pakistan qualified for military assistance for the "greater defence of the Middle East, in cooperation with its Middle Eastern neighbours." A change in the nature of US aid to Pakistan was signaled by the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of May 19, 1954, and the Secret aid Memorandum of October 21, 1954, which went into effect in 1954. The Military Assistance Program is formally and

substantively based on these two agreements (MAP). The US military commitments to Pakistan were strengthened and validated by Pakistan's membership in the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which was established in 1954, the Baghdad Pact (CENTO), which was signed in 1955, and a subsequent Cooperation Agreement between the two nations (Iqbal and Khalid, 2011)..

The Cold War has emerged as a major issue by the end of the second World War in 1945. Pakistan got assistance from the United States. India sought Soviet friendship and assistance for its development goals and non-aligned movement despite its pro-Soviet stance took place. On the other side, the West had made a complete commitment to the strengthening of Pakistan's military apparatus in order to achieve its global security objectives (Rose, 1985).

Acquisition of Nuclear Power

Nothing, perhaps, creates more strategic jitters in Pakistan's surrounding countries, and perhaps in certain sectors overseas, than the country's peaceful nuclear programme. Pakistan's admission was endorsed by the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna in 1957. The US Atoms for Peace programme, which also backed Pakistan's election to the board of governors. The US assisted Pakistani scientists in running the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission under CENTO and SEATO. Misinformation and exaggeration are to blame for the misconceptions concerning Pakistan's nuclear plants. The facility in Kanupp, near Karachi, was completely protected by IAEA safeguards and has undergone ninety-four inspections to date. It has the most up-to-date monitoring technologies, such as fuel bundle counters that automatically record all fuel usage inside in out. Pinstech, a

laboratory-scale training center in Islamabad, was bought in 1974 with full public knowledge. Even if operated for decades, it is too tiny to manufacture any substantial amount of plutonium. It is also fully safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A light-water reactor is the foundation of the small-scale uranium enrichment facility Kahuta, which was created specifically to satisfy Pakistan's future energy needs. The goal of the research and development projects undertaken by Pinstech and Kahuta is to achieve self-sufficiency in the nuclear fuel cycle. This enrichment research and development effort is nothing more than insurance against arbitrary stops in the supply of enriched uranium needed for Pakistan's planned power reactors after the country's tragic experience with unilateral betrayals by Canada and France (Haqqani, 2013).

Pakistan's current hydro, domestic gas, oil, and coal resources are anticipated to be exhausted by the turn of the century, leaving a gap in power generation capacity of about 8,000 MW, even with a low economic growth rate (about 5% per year in the gross domestic product). Pakistan already spends 60-70 percent of its foreign exchange revenues on oil imports. The economics of nuclear power generation against oil-fired facilities are strongly in favour of the former. Unfortunately, the US has adopted a nuclear policy that is seen as a unilateral imposition of its self-defined ideals on the rest of the world, much like the US-China relationship. When Pakistan established the first aviation link with China in 1964, Sen. Wayne Morse called the events of the 1950s and 1960s a "major rupture in free world unity." This led to Pakistan's receiving no more financial aid after that. Six years later, the United States used that same "breach" to construct a new global strategic equilibrium (Rose, 1985).

US Economic Assistance to Pakistan

Financial aid from wealthy nations to less fortunate people around the world is a relatively recent development. In actuality, it is a result of post-World War II global conditions. The US's first significant effort in this area was to offer financial aid to several European nations that had been devastated by World War II. Since then, a lot has happened highly industrialized countries have poured vast sums of money into the world's less developed nation, The United States is leading the way (Arora, and Grover, [1995](#)).

While such programmes of economic assistance have been justified by foreign aid donors on a variety of moral grounds, including the "have" countries' moral responsibility to the "Haves" and "Have-Nots," and in an effort to restore the balance, bridging the gap between industrialized and poor countries in terms of industrial development John D. Saunders, for example, is a writer. It is too foolish, according to Montgomery and Hans J. Morgenthau, to imagine that such economic help is the consequence of pure charity. Indeed, as Montgomery notes, "International politics are at the core of foreign aid and are, in fact, the foundation for its existence." This investigation's goal is to examine a specific instance of American economic assistance to Pakistan in order to assess the veracity of the assertion that "international politics lies at the heart of foreign aid." The validity of the author's two hypotheses, which are related to Pakistan-American relations, depends on whether Montgomery's claim about American economic aid to Pakistan can be successfully tested. This is because of the author's inspiration from Montgomery's remark (Bashir, [2014](#)). The two most important hypotheses that will be examined in this paper are as follows: (1) After the two countries signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Treaty, American economic

assistance to Pakistan would have significantly increased if international politics were at the core of foreign aid. (2) If foreign aid is primarily driven by international politics (Ayoob, [1965](#)).

Strategic Gains

Pakistani foreign policy toward the US from the late 1950s to the middle 1960s, with a focus on state-level meetings involving Presidents Ayub Khan, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson. These one-on-one meetings between country leaders were in charge of defining and implementing foreign policy goals. Their diverse personalities and leadership approaches resulted in stronger political ties between the two countries' presidents. This article looks at significant historical and political events that occurred during the Cold War. It also discusses how America's containment policy forced Pakistan to become a strategic partner against the Soviet Union. Additionally, the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War led to a marked deterioration in the nations' relations. The United States and Pakistan enjoy a cordial relationship. Pakistan as a result began to develop closer ties and an alliance with the People's Republic of China in addition to changing its relationship with the US. Pakistan's foreign policy was pro-western in order to strengthen its regional position in South Asia against India; Ayub Khan's high-level meetings with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson demonstrated these ambitions for greater industrialization, but they were unable to find a permanent solution to the Kashmir conflict (Akram, [2016](#)).

Negative impacts of alliances on Pakistan

To strengthen their capabilities and thwart the perceived threat, the States join alliances. However, this strategy has political repercussions in addition to costing money. These could consider counteroffensives,

counteralliances, or other unfavorable responses from other nations. The weak states that form alliances are well aware that they will have to deal with the consequences rather than reap any benefits; Pakistan was no exception. Its choice to form an alliance came with a slew of expenses (Hassian, 2016).

Political

The main effect of joining the alliance was the deterioration of relations with India, Muslim countries, and communist governments. Pakistan's main motivation for entering the Western pact was to gain assistance for the Kashmir issue and to be armed with the requisite weapons, but Pakistan was unable to achieve these goals. Many political experts backed Pakistan's choice to join Western pacts, arguing that it would secure US backing for the Kashmir issue. Even Ayub Khan conceded that Pakistan's efforts to gain US help for the Kashmir problem had failed. Ayub Khan added that the US did not use its influence to end the conflict in Kashmir. "At first, the United States assured that the Kashmir issue would be resolved. However, the US later reversed its position on the Kashmir problem (Hassian, 2016). Pakistan was irritated by the United States largesse in aid to India. Even in 1962, when India and China were at odds over a border dispute, Pakistan was shocked by US military assistance to India. The United States' persistent supply of armaments to India disturbed the regional power balance, causing anxiety in Pakistan.

India did not approve of the US-Pakistan alliance, accusing Pakistan of fomenting a Cold War in the region and foregoing his promise to hold a referendum in Kashmir. Nehru claimed that Pakistan's participation in Western pacts was destroying Indo-Pak relations and the Kashmir issue in a letter to his Pakistani counterpart. All of this showed Pakistan that

it is able to accomplish its objectives but it will be unable to accomplish its objective of Kashmir without others. However, the US was unwilling to resolve Pakistan's problem within the parameters of its own goal, namely the containment policy. In other words, the objectives of the two allies were different. It could be argued that when a small power is forced to rely on a stronger force to support its regional strategies, little state power in territorial concerns is lost. Also acknowledging that American aid contributed to the deterioration of India's relations was Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra. Pakistan believes that because of the US's accommodative stance towards India, the US favours non-aligned nations over all states. Ayub Khan claimed that Pakistan is being forced by US funding to India when he visited the US in July 1961. It must take a neutral stance and reevaluate its commitment to Western alliances (Hilali, 2006).

The United States' reduced military assistance to Pakistan as a result of its closer ties to and support for India had an effect on the nation. On the basis of this, Z.A. Bhutto asserted that Pakistan had been abandoned by the US because it had given more in order to become a Western ally. Z. A. Bhutto is accused of treason. American military aid to India increased in nearly proportion to Pakistan's protests. One of the main reasons why Pakistan and the US's alliance weakened in 1962 was due to military assistance to India, which allayed any fears that the US only provided assistance to nations battling communism. Pakistan was justified in its dissatisfaction with SEATO since it did not feel safe from an alleged Indian attack. Pakistan did not receive a satisfying reaction from the Soviet Union over its affiliation with Western countries; while the Soviet Union's initial stance toward Pakistan's establishment was unfavorable, it eventually recognized Pakistan's presence. The Indo-Pak rivalry, on the other hand, was what allowed the

Soviets to enter the region. In retaliation for its actions, Pakistan is to blame because the Soviet Union openly supported India's claim to Kashmir. They supported Afghan ambitions for Pakhtunistan (Akram, [2016](#)). This is why Khrushchev informed the Pakistani envoy in Moscow that a "Red Circle" had been drawn on the map around Peshawar on July 18, 1959, when Pakistan gave the United States a communication facility at Badber and airfields over Soviet territory. Pakistan did not react favourably in 1956 despite the Soviet Union sending Pakistan some positive signals. As a result, relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union remained tense, and starting in 1956, the Soviet Union started to support India by using its veto power over Kashmir (Iqbal and Khalid, [2011](#)).

Due to their conviction that it was incompatible with the fundamental principles of the Muslim Ummah, Muslim states had strong reservations about joining the Western alliance. In the event of a conflict, Pakistan would be fighting against its own sibling nations because numerous nations were allied with the Soviet Union. Egypt reacted angrily to the Baghdad accord, characterizing it as an external imposition rather than Arab goals. As a result, the Egyptian government, like the Soviet administration, began lobbying the Indian government to proclaim Kashmir an integral part of India. This hostility was also evident during the Suez crisis, when Egypt agreed to receive Indian troops but decided to bar Pakistani troops from entering out of concern that Pakistan, as an ally in the Baghdad accord, would insist on remaining on Egyptian territory. Pakistan was designated an enemy state, making it unique in this regard (Leo E. Rose, [1985](#)).

Similarly, Saudi Arabia resented Pakistan because of the Baghdad Accord, and Pakistan Turkey felt privileged by partnering with Jews. Afghanistan's reaction to Pakistan's joining the American

alliance was likewise hostile. Utilizing the opportunity, the Soviet Union offered the unwavering support. Pak-Afghan relations deteriorated due to Soviet support over the Pakhtunistan issue (Bashir, [2014](#)).

Strategic

Due to Pakistan's dependence on US administration approval, which the US did not take responsibility for itself and instead imposed on Pakistan, none of these Western agreements could benefit Pakistan, including the facilitation of the US in the event of conflict. By replacing British methods with an updated American training motif, the Mutual Security Assistance Agreement (MSAA) between Pakistan and the United States changed the structure of military training. This arrangement made Pakistan very dependent on US weapons, and when the US imposed an arms embargo during the Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971, Pakistan seemed powerless to counter the threat. When the weaker partner was presented with issues, it was widely assumed that the US alliances seemed to help to become sedentary in order to help the weaker partner"

Once we joined the US-led alliances, India turned into our main foe, which had an effect on all of India's relations with other nations. India served as the impetus for a campaign against Pakistan. Pakistan was already India's enemy, but after it signed these military agreements, it turned into a ferocious foe, and India started to emphasize its military power. Pakistan's ties to the West and the United States played a significant role in the country's disintegration in 1971. Afghanistan, which has strong ties to India, has turned against Pakistan and even long refused to recognize it. The creation of Pakistan was a problem for them, although Afghanistan is a crucial Muslim country for Pakistan. The cause was Indian influence, which was antagonistic to Pakistan's relations with the US, leading to

an increase in Pakistan's hostility towards the US and other western nations. Pakistan is at the top(Kumar, 2006).

The Soviet Union was unhappy with its participation in pacts supported by the West. As a result of the US U-2 plane being shot down on Soviet soil, Khrushchev threatened to destroy Peshawar, amplifying the harm caused by the alliances. The Soviet Union also increased its influence in Afghanistan by providing financial and military support. India and Afghanistan's governments grew closer to the Soviet Union, received Soviet weapons, and their combined military might was greater than Pakistan's. "As part of a western-sponsored force, it receives military aid"(Bashir, [2014](#)).

Economic

Since it was anticipated that Pakistan's military spending would decrease after joining these alliances and signing the MSAA, this did not occur, and as a result, Pakistan did not achieve its intended economic goals from the alliances. President Ayub Khan was one of many political commentators who claimed that economic gains were SEATO's main motivation. In speeches given in 1959 and 1960, Pakistan's foreign minister expressed similar concerns. The United States, on the other hand, refused to compare the economic benefits of SEATO to those of other aid agreements. Though they were insignificant in comparison to other aid relationships, it did introduce some training initiatives (Markey, [2013](#)).

Membership in these western-sponsored military alliances undoubtedly benefited Pakistan economically, as seen by Pakistan's attitude on membership in these pacts. In a nutshell, signing these western pacts alienated non-aligned nations, particularly Arab neutral nations, and led to increased Soviet support for India, harm to Pakistan's Kashmir cause, the puzzling

Afghan-sponsored Pushtunistan issue, and increased harm to Kashmir(Malik, 2019).

Conclusion

The relationship between the United States and Pakistan has experienced many ups and downs, marked by convergence and divergence of interests. Each country has attempted to sway the other by focusing on its own needs and objectives. Pakistan, which was previously seen as the United States' most allied partner when it was well-suited to US goals in the 1950s, was sanctioned in the 1970s. Pakistan has a proclivity towards regional impulses, but the US is more likely to consider global dynamics in its partnerships. By obtaining significant financial and military support from the US, Pakistan's alliance with the US was primarily intended to guarantee Pakistan's security against India. The United States has traditionally dismissed Pakistan's security worries as insignificant, underestimating the country's commitments. On the other hand, Pakistan has failed to recognize that, despite the costs and consequences, over-dependence on the United States can cause it to suffer significantly. Pakistan has failed to recognize that the primary goal of this alliance is to achieve US global objectives. The United States is unconcerned with Pakistan's security concerns. Her major goal is to retain her global dominion and crush any forces that threaten her power. As a result, the US-Pakistan relationship has lacked stability, mutual trust, confidence, a larger conceptual framework, and a shared goal for much of its history. It's no surprise that as soon as the US achieved its goals in Pakistan, it leaves her alone. Pakistan was either neglected or subjected to a succession of punitive measures that generated a sense of resentment and betrayal. Pakistan has historically suffered enormous casualties whenever it has moved closer to the United States with the goal of achieving security

objectives. Pakistan has always had to compromise and make concessions on its security objectives and the help it receives has always been tied to certain conditions that are detrimental to Pakistan's interests. The US-Pakistan alliance has never worked in Pakistan's favour since it was never intended to help or secure Pakistan. It was only used to contain communism. Pakistan joined military alliances led by the United States, although these agreements were not intended to ensure Pakistan's security. Pakistan utilized American weapons against India in the 1965 war, which irritated the US to the point where it stopped supporting Pakistan and cut off economic and military cooperation in 1965. It is also a hard fact that whenever Pakistan interacted with the US to advance its interests in the region, it caused Pakistan a great deal of trouble and increased its exposure to both internal and external threats. For example, Pakistan's entry into the Western camp in the 1950s, which enraged the Soviet Union, and as a result, Pakistan became more exposed and vulnerable to internal and external threats. Another negative aspect of the Pakistan-US alliance is that the US has never appreciated Pakistan's sacrifices and has always preferred India over Pakistan. Thus it can be said that the Indian factor has always dominated the Pak-US alliance.

Policy Recommendations

Pakistan's alliance with the US has had a variety of consequences. Pakistan was forced to build connections with the US due to poor economic conditions, threats to her life, and other considerations, yet there are far more costs than gains. Pakistan serves as a tool for the United States, which it can use whenever its interests require it. The following are some tips for preventing such events in Pakistan.

Relations on basis equality

Pakistan should create a relationship on equal footings with the United States. There should be no distinction between significant and minor issues. Their relationship must be built on trust and confidence. Pakistan's connections with the US should not be viewed as imperialistic. The United States should not meddle in Pakistan's internal affairs. Pakistan's national interests should be prioritized. There is an urgent need for real, honest, and patriotic leadership that can install confidence in the Pakistani people that no foreign force can defeat and betray them.

Reduce Dependence on the US

Pakistan shouldn't depend solely on one nation; it wouldn't be wrong to say that if you depend on one nation, you must accept the demands and obligations from the other side as well as the consequences. The United States had indirect control over Pakistan's internal and external affairs through its aid and assistance. Pakistan should lessen its reliance on the United States while maintaining a balance in its relations. Pakistan is a poor country and is in need of aid to meet its challenges. In order to meet these issues, Pakistan should form economic partnerships with other countries. Only by focusing on economic growth, it will be able to minimize its reliance.

Maintain a balance in relations with other nations

Pakistan should maintain a balance in its relations with other nations. It should cultivate positive relations with all of the world's major nations, such as Japan, Germany, Russia etc. It should also create excellent relations with its surrounding countries and the Muslim world, and promote trade and commerce with these countries to do so, which will not only help

its economic growth but also pave the road for amicable relations.

Strategic collaboration with adversary states

Pakistan should create a strategic relationship with India and it should use mutual negotiations to settle all issues. It should also resolve its differences and disputes with other countries, including Afghanistan and Iran. Pakistan should examine and monitor its policy objectives, as well as undertake developmental projects with these countries, in order to boost its economy.

National Morale and a Positive Image in the International Community

Pakistan must improve its national morale and gain a positive international image. It's possible and can be accomplished by effectively handling internal and external issues, and it should not jeopardize its sovereignty at any cost. It should bring the country's internal strife to a halt and restore stability. Terrorism, militancy, insurgency, poverty, illiteracy, corruption, bribery, nepotism, sectarianism, racism, and other social ills should all be addressed by the government. Pakistan should prioritize both local and international peace. Pakistan's policymakers should push policies that will help Pakistan gain a reputation as a sovereign and peace-loving nation. National morale and a country's image in the international community are important factors in determining a country's position and prestige.

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